Section I Introduction
There is considerable analytical work comparing the economic performance of China and India to understand the growth processes in these economies. Analysts have also sought to examine the effect of their rapid growth on the world economy as well as on other developing economies, particularly those in Africa. 1 We do not discuss the reforms themselves which have been extensively studied. (1992) and Brandt, Rawski and Sutton (2008) for industrial sector reforms, Bahl and Wallich (1992), Ma Jun (1995) and Wong and Bird (2008) for fiscal reforms, Allen, Qian and Qian (2008), Geiger (2006) , Green (2005) for reforms in the financial sector and the conduct of monetary policy, and World Bank (2004) and the Trade Policy Reports of the WTO for the trade system and changes in it. Also see Agarwal (2010) for an analysis of Chinese reforms. See Bhagwati (1993) and Panagariya(2008) for an analysis of Indian reforms. The reforms are described in the Economic Survey published every year by the Ministry of Finance before the budget is presented to parliament.
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We also look at the growth rate of per capita GDP, XGS, GFCF. We compare the average values of these indicators for the decade of the 1980s, 1990s and the 2000s.
Using a two tailed-test we find that China does better than India for most of these indicators. For instance, China has a higher growth rate of per capita income, XGS and GFCF as also a higher share of XGS, GFCF etc in GDP than does India. We also calculate the coefficient of variation (CV) for these indicators for these decades. We find that China usually has a lower CV, namely a more stable performance. But only a few of the indictors show a lower CV over the decades in the case of China. In the case of India, the CV declines over the decades for most of the indicators. Thus over time the levels of the CV in India are approaching those in China, namely the two economies are becoming more similar.
We also compare the two economies since their reforms as the reforms have influenced their growth paths. When we do this we find a number of similarities. For instance, in every year during the period 1979-2010, exports were a larger share in Chinese GDP than in Indian GDP When it comes to China and India, China has posted much higher rates of growth in all the three sectors than India. But the significant acceleration in India in the rates of growth of manufacturing and services output during the period 2000-2009 compared to the earlier period suggests that the gap in performance between China and India may be narrowing 1 .
These differential sector rates of growth determine the structure of production in the different regions and in the two countries China and India. What is particularly striking is that the share of manufacturing in GDP is much higher in EAP than the other regions. Furthermore, this share has declined n regions other than EAP. Also share of agriculture in GDP has dropped in Asia but for very different reasons. This has happened in EAP despite rapid growth in agricultural output whereas in SA growth of agricultural output has been almost the lowest among the different regions (Table 3) . (Lele, Agarwal, Timmer and Goswami, 2012 ). In Latin America the actual share of agricultural value-added in GDP is larger than predicted and agriculture's share in employment is less than predicted. The major difference in Asia is that the share of agriculture in employment is larger than predicted, and the positive residuals have been increasing over time.
This is true for both China and India, though the residuals are much larger for China than for India. 1 This contrasts, for instance, with Brazil where the residuals for employment are negative and have been becoming more negative. The Asian economies, in contrast to those in Latin America, have not been able to generate enough non-agricultural employment.
The share of services in GDP is the lowest in Asia. While the share of agriculture in GDP is larger in India (18%) than in China (15%), it has been falling more rapidly in India where agricultural productivity has grown more slowly than in China. 2 The share of manufacturing in GDP was already much higher in China in 1979 than in India, and has 1 Kotwal, Ramaswami and Wadhwa (2011) compare behaviour employment in agriculture to that in the now developed countries but not to other developing countries. Our analysis suggests that the behavior in India is typical of land scarce Asian countries 2 The conclusion holds whether productivity is measured per hectare or per worker or whether measures of total factor productivity are used (Lele, Agarwal, Timmer and Goswami, 2012 ).
remained much higher. However, the services sector is much larger in India. Again the performance of Asia contrasts with that of LAC.
Economic performance in Asia and within it of China and India has been propelled by investment. Investment ratios in East Asia are almost twice those in Africa and Latin America (Table 4) . Investment rates in SA have been increasing, and though still considerably lower than in EAP may soon approach those levels. China invests even more than other countries in its region, almost half its GDP; India in recent years has invested about a third of its GDP slightly more than other countries in its region. Also, the investment ratio is more similar between China and India than it is for either country with the ratio in LAC or SSA. 
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But not only are investment levels in Asia higher than other developing country regions, there is greater efficiency in the use of capital as measured by the incremental capital output ratio (ICOR). After the oil price rise of 1973 the capital output doubled in the rest of the world and it is has remained high since (Agarwal, 2008) . But it increased considerably less in East Asia and it actually declined in South Asia so that since the early 1980s it has been the same in East and South Asia.
Figure1 Incremental Capital output Ratios
The incremental capital output ratio was considerably lower in China than in India till 1998 ( Figure 1 ). 1 Since then the ICOR in the two countries has been roughly the same.
1 The capital output ratio is calculated as the moving average of the sum of investment over 5 years divided by the increase in income during this period with a one year lag, i.e, ∑i=1 5 Ii/(Y6-Y1) Despite the success of the two economies in increasing exports the behavior of the current account has been different for the two economies. China has usually had a surplus on the current account and at times this surplus has been very large and China has accumulated large reserves. India, on the other hand, has usually run deficits and in recent years these deficits have become very large raising the question of the sustainability of the growth process.
Section III How Different is India's Experience with Liberalization Compared to China's

III.1 Comparing the performance over the same period
The general perception is that China is a more open economy that has depended more on exports of goods for its growth. India's success has been less dependent on exports and more dependent on domestic demand. India, however, has done better in exports of services while China has depended more on exports of manufactures and this export has resulted in very rapid growth of the manufacturing sector. China also has had much higher rates of investment than has India. This general perception is borne out by the data on the performance of the two economies.
We calculate the behavior of a number of indicators over the period 1981 to 2010 (Table 5 ). We generally find that China does better on the basis of these indicators than India does. India does better only in the inflow of workers' remittances throughout the period.
However, the differences in the rates of growth of XGS and of GFCF are not significant at the 5 percent level.  Not significant; ** significant at 5%; others significant at 1%.  # CAB is current account balance, XGS is exports of goods and services, FDI is inflow of foreign direct investment, GDS is gross domestic savings, GFCF is gross fixed capital formation, ODA is official development assistance, PrK is inflow of private capital, Rem is inflow of remittances, GDP PC is per capita gross domestic product.
The average rate of growth of exports of goods and services was higher in India in the 1980s than it was in China, even though the share of XGS in GDP remained higher in China. But in China the share of XGS in GDP increased from 12.3 in the 1980s to 20.6 percent in the nineties, whereas in India it increased from 5,9 percent to 10.5 percent between these two periods. Another difference between the two economies was that the Indian economy was more dependent on aid than was the Chinese economy.
We now look at the stability of the economy in terms of the behavior of these 12 consistently lower CV in China. Though the Indian economy is becoming more stable it is as yet not as stable as the Chinese economy. As far as the CAB/GDP indicator is concerned it is negative for India and positive for China so CV is greater in China than in India. But if we look at the absolute size, we find that over time the CV has been decreasing in China, but has been increasing in India. So not only is the deficit CAB becoming larger in India it is showing greater variability.  # CAB is current account balance, XGS is exports of goods and services, FDI is inflow of foreign direct investment, GDS is gross domestic savings, GFCF is gross fixed capital formation, ODA is official development assistance, PrK is inflow of private capital, Rem is inflow of remittances, GDP PC is per capita gross domestic product.
III.2 Comparing since the reforms
There is another way and we believe a more fruitful way of analyzing the performance of the two economies. Since the performance of the two economies has, it is believed, been
propelled by liberalization the performances should be measured since the start of the 19 years after reform per capita income in China was 450 percent of that in the initial year whereas it was only 250 percent in India.
But a slightly different picture emerges if we plot the year to year growth rates in per capita income. The difference in growth rates was larger in the first ten years of the reform and has narrowed since then (Figure 3) . Furthermore though the average growth rate was higher in China the variability was also higher. The average annual growth rate of per capita income was 8.7 percent in China and was 5.1 percent in India. But the variance of this growth rate was 10.8
in China and 4.5 in India. 
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The similarity in the behavior of share of XGS in GDP is striking if we compare its evolution since the respective reforms ( Figure 5 ). Here the common area is 88 percent of the total are and the not common area is only 12 percent of the whole. India, as also the growth rate. Also, the large increases occurred a number of years after the start of the reforms, so that initially domestic demand seems to have been the basis of the growth.
1 We take the share of exports in GDP in the first year as 100 and express the shares in subsequent years as an index of the share in the base year. However, the share of trade in goods in GDP has increased more in India than in China ( Figure   7 ). This is a reflection of the deficit on goods trade that India has run whereas china has usually had a surplus. Relative to its GDP India's importance as a demander in the world market has been growing when compared to China's. The difference in the export performance of the two sectors does not translate into the behavior of value added in the two sectors. Share of manufacturing value added in GDP has been declining in both the economies and more rapidly in China (Figure 9 ). The common area is 87 percent. Share of value added in services has been increasing in both the economies and surprisingly more rapidly in China (Figure 10 ). The common area in this case is 80 percent. Another difference usually mentioned is that the ratio of investment to GDP has been higher in China. Again, while this is true at the absolute level, the path of change is very similar FDI inflows are also thought to have been important in China for its manufacturing sector and for its manufacturing exports. India has not been able to attract as much FDI, but again the picture is more complex. For almost the first decade after the reforms were initiated in each economy FDI as a percent of GDP behaved similarly in the two economies ( Figure 12 ).
Then in year10 and 11 there was a surge in FDI to China. So FDI seems to have contributed little to the initial spurt in growth. 1 But since then share of FDI in GDP has fallen in China whereas it has risen in India so the gap is again narrowing. The common area is 60 percent.
1 Bardhan (2010) also notes that the large increases in exports and FDI occurred later than the growth acceleration. 
Section V Concluding Remarks
Per capita GDP has grown more rapidly in China than in India; however, growth has fluctuated more in China than in India. When we look at the behavior of 12 indicators we find that China does better in most of them. Not only is the level higher in China, i.e., the share of GFCF or of XGS in GDP is higher in China, but most of the indicators show lower variability in China. But a slightly different picture emerges if we look at the dynamics of a number of variables since the reforms. The rate of increase in exports of goods and services and of gross fixed capital formation since the reforms has been the same in the two economies. Exports of goods grew more rapidly in China than in India. But the more rapid growth of exports of manufactures in China and of services in India did not translate into very different rates of growth of the two sectors. The changes in the shares of value-added in the two sectors are very similar with the share of services increasing slightly faster in China, but also the share of manufacturing declining slightly faster in China.
Rapid growth of the Chinese economy and its exports has forced considerable adjustment in other countries. It has also raised the profile of China and along with it of other developing countries in the international economic governance system. For instance, the G8 was not expanded to merely admit China. Initially the Heiligendamm process was initiated when consultations were held between the G8 and 5 other large developing countries, Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa. Later after the onset of the financial crisis of 2008 the G8 was expanded to the G20.
It is difficult to predict the future path for the Indian economy. There is the temptation to project that the Indian economy will continue tracking the Chinese economy. In that case 28 further substantial changes will occur in the international economy. Projections suggest that the share of the Indian economy in the world economy will increase substantially though less than that of China (Agarwal, 2008) . China had thirty years of a prosperous international economy before the onset of the crisis of 2008. For twenty years the Indian economy has tracked well the path of the Chinese economy. But now it is difficult to see how in the changed international environment the Indian economy can continue to track the Chinese economy for the third decade after reform.
